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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
MARIO ALBERTO GARCIA,

CaseNo.20100860-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The trial court entered judgment against Mario Alberto Garcia for attempted
illegal possession/use of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2008), and driving under the influence of
alcohol/drugs and causing bodily injury, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2008), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Royal I. Hansen, presiding. Jurisdiction is
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2008). Garcia
filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 31. See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment,
Conviction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive
sentences where the court did not consider all the statutorily required factors.
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a decision to impose consecutive

sentences for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995). "An abuse of discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally
relevant [sentencing] factors,'" (State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) (citation omitted)), or when the trial judge fails to give '"adequate weight to certain
mitigating circumstances."5 State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^|15, 40 P.3d 626 (citation
omitted).
Preservation: This issue was preserved when defense counsel asked the trial court
to follow the State's sentencing recommendation of thirty days in jail followed by
deportation. R. 38:7. This issue can also be reviewed for plain error. See Utah R. Crim.
P. 22(e) C'[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner, at any time.").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The test of the following relevant provision is provided in full in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below
On November 7, 2007, an Information was filed charging Mario Alberto Garcia
("Mr. Garcia") with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i); Driving While Under the
Influence and Causing Bodily Injury, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6a-502; Failure to Stop at the Scene of an Injury Accident, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-401; Operation of Vehicle Without
2

Security, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302; Unlawful
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37a-5; No Driver's License, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 53-3-202; and Failure to Stop for a Red Light, a class C misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-305. R. 1-4.
On September 21, 2010, Mr. Garcia entered a plea of guilty to an amended count
of Attempted Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2008); and Driving While Under the
Influence and Causing Bodily Injury, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2008), with the State's agreement to dismiss all other counts.
Mr. Garcia waived the time for sentencing. Defense counsel told the trial court
that the "State has made a recommendation of 30 days jail, and then [a] release[] to ICE
for deportation." R. 38:7. The trial court sentenced Mr. Garcia to the agreed upon 30
days in jail followed by deportation or release to ICE for deportation, but also sentenced
him to two consecutive 365 day terms in jail, suspended, and a fine of $4,625 on each
count, suspended. R. 25-26. The jail term (except for the 30 days) and fine were
suspended based on the court's terms and conditions of probation, which were as follows:
36 months of probation; fine of $1,600; attorney's fees in the amount of $300; imposition
of all DUI conditions if Mr. Garcia were to return to the United States; issuance of a
$50,000 cash only bench warrant to be issued upon deportation in the event that Mr.
Garcia unlawfully reentered the United States. R. 25-26; 38:7-9.
On October 20, 2010, Garcia filed a notice of appeal. R. 31-32. The appeal is
3

timely. See Utah R. App. P. 3 & 4 (2009).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 3, 2007, law enforcement officers responded to a report of a traffic
accident with injuries. R. 3-4. Mr. Garcia was identified as the driver of the vehicle
which caused the traffic accident resulting in injuries. R. 4. Methamphetamine was
located in Mr. Garcia's pocket and a subsequent blood test revealed that at the time of
operating the vehicle, Mr. Garcia had methamphetamine in his blood. R. 4; 38:4.
On September 21, 2010, Mr. Garcia accepted a plea agreement offered by the
State and pled guilty to the amended charge of Attempted Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (2008), and Driving While Under the Influence and Causing Bodily Injury, a
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2008). R. 25-30; 38.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss all other counts and
recommend a sentence of 30 days in jail followed by release to ICE for purposes of
deportation. R. 25-30; 38:7.
Mr. Garcia waived the time for sentencing and was sentenced at the time he
entered his plea, on September 21, 2010. R. 25-26; 38:7-8. Mr. Garcia had an ICE hold
at the time of sentencing. R. 38:7. At sentencing, the trial court accepted the
recommendation of 30 days jail, however, the court also imposed a sentence of two
consecutive 365 day jail commitments, suspended, and included conditions of afineand
recoupment fee, as well as a 36 month probation period, including all standard DUI
provisions, namely assessment and treatment, installation of an interlock device, and
4

victim impact panel. R. 25-26.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences because it did not
consider all of the statutory factors mandated under Utah law. Specifically, the trial court
failed to give Mr. Garcia's mitigating circumstances adequate weight. Instead, the court
imposed consecutive sentences citing only to Mr. Garcia's need for treatment and the
danger the offenses posed to the community. The trial court's failure to consider all the
mandatory factors before imposing consecutive sentences was an abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WHERE THE COURT DID
NOT GIVE MR. GARCIA'S MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
ADEQUATE WEIGHT.
A trial court's "[a]buse of discretion 'may be manifest if the actions of the judge in
sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly excessive
sentence.'"" State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). A
trial court abuses its discretion when it "'fails to consider all legally relevant [sentencing]
factors,'" State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1235 (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133,
1135 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted)), or when the trial judge fails to give "'adequate
weight to certain mitigating circumstances.'" Helms, 2002 UT 12 at ^15 (quoting State v.
Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998)). This Court will find a trial court has abused its
discretion when it concludes that "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by
the trial court." Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (quotation omitted).
5

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-401(2) outlines the legally relevant sentencing factors a
trial court is mandated to consider before determining whether sentences will be imposed
concurrently or consecutively. Utah's appellate courts have noted that "[concurrent
sentences are favored over consecutive ones." State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, \ 43, 52
P.3d 451 (citations omitted).
Section 76-3-401 states in part the following:
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). Pursuant to this provision, a trial court must consider
"the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id,; see also Helms, 2002 UT 12 at \9.
Utah appellate courts have found an abuse of discretion in imposing consecutive
sentences where the trial court failed to give adequate weight to the defendant's
mitigating circumstances. For example, in State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), the
supreme court held that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive
sentences because it failed to consider mitigating circumstances. Id. at 938. Despite the
seriousness of Galli's convictions, the consecutive sentences were vacated because the
trial court did not consider Galli's rehabilitative needs and mitigating circumstances. Id;
see also State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301-02 (Utah 1993) (consecutive sentences
reversed because the trial court failed to "sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative
needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior violent crimes...").
6

In State v. Helms, although the trial court did not make findings regarding its
sentencing order, the court held that the record amply demonstrated that the trial court
appropriately imposed consecutive sentences. 2002 UT 12, U 13. The court could
assume that the trial court considered all legally relevant factors in spite of the lack of
detailed findings in the sentencing order because the trial court stated that it had carefully
gone over the extensive presentence report. Id. The presentence report covered all of the
legally relevant sentencing factors, including the "gravity and circumstances of the
offenses" and the "history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id.
(citations omitted). However, in State v. Perez, this Court found the trial court's basis for
imposing consecutive sentences was insufficient, as "[t]he trial court's brief commentary
dealt only with the 'gravity and circumstances of the offenses' ... [and] there is nothing
in this record to indicate that the trial court 'considered the ... history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive
sentences.'" 2002 UT App 211, If 48 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401).
In the present case, just as in Perez, the record - particularly the trial court's
remarks during sentencing - indicates that the trial court did not adequately consider the
required statutory factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). There was no
presentence report covering all of the legally relevant sentencing factors. The trial court
only briefly dealt with the "gravity and circumstances of the offenses" when it
commented on "the danger that [the offenses that have been committed] pose to the
community." R. 38:8; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2). The trial court did not
consider any mitigating circumstances, including Mr. Garcia's youth, as he was only 20
7

years old at the time of the offense, and his apparent lack of any prior criminal history.
Additionally, while the court directly referenced Mr. Garcia's "need for treatment," the
imposition of two consecutive 365 day terms does nothing in the way of providing
treatment for Mr. Garcia. R. 38:8. This is simply an insufficient basis to justify imposing
consecutive sentences. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to consider all legally
relevant factors in deciding to impose consecutive sentences.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Mr. Garcia respectfully asks that this Court vacate his sentence
and remand for resentencing.
SUBMITTED this _ \ L day of January, 2011.

^^i^pVw^^
JACQUELINE R. HOPKINSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JACQUELINE R. HOPKINSON, hereby certify that I have caused to be handdelivered the original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals,
450 South State, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four
copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300
South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this V j _ day of
January, 2011.

JACQUELINE R. HOPKINSON

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this

day of January, 2011.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
MARIO ALBERTO GARCIA,
Defendant

Case No: 071904147 FS
Judge:
ROYAL I HANSEN
Date:
September 21, 2010

PRESENT
Clerk:
terryb
Prosecutor: STANGER, CRAIG N
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): VIERA, BRENDA M
Interpreter: Cecilia Alomia (Spanish)
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Language: Spanish
Date of birth: May 7, 1987
Video
Tape Number:
S 41
Tape Count: 12.14
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL
Class A Misdemeanor^
Plea: Guilty 2. DRIVING UNDER THE
Plea: Guilty -

POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended)
Disposition: 09/21/2010 Guilty
INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class A Misdemeanor
Disposition: 09/21/2010 Guilty

Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
Change of Plea Note
Based upon state's motion and pursuant to plea agreement, amend
count 1 to MA - Attempted. Defendant pled guilty to amended count
1 and count 2 as charged.
HEARING
Defendant's country of origin is Mexico.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for
this charge is 365 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 365
day(s) .
Credit is granted for time served.
Page 1

Case No: 071904147 Date:

Sep 21, 2010

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
Defendant is to serve 110 days in jail with Credit for time served.
Upon completion of Jail time, defendant to be released to ICE for
deportation
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Charges to run CONSECUTIVE to each other
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
Pine to be referred to State Debt Collection.
Attorney Fees
Amount; $300.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
Attorney fees to be referred to State Debt Collection.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Violate no. laws.
Do not re-enter the country illegally.
Defendant not to remain in the country illegally.
No Drugs or Alcohol
If defendant returns to the United States, he is not to drive
unless hes has a valid license, title and insurance.
Defendant to comply with all standard DUI conditions. Victim
Impact panel, Drug & Alcohol Assessment, and have Interlock device
installed at .020.
Pay $1600.00 fine and $300.00 Attorney fees.
$50,000 Cash Only Bench Warrant to issue ugon deportation.
Serve 120 days in jail (Credit for tim^ser^e^may given.)
Date:

q-aiyup

R^YAjLTHo^NSEN
Bi stfe*KTd@t% O a u r t J u d g e

Page 2

(last)
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401 (2003)
76-3-401 Concurrent or consecutive sentences -Limitations -Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. The
court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other;
and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with
any other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims,
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to
run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified order of
commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under
Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty
or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.

(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving
rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other
court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and
Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that
consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located.
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